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is that the grandparent and the child have an independent interest in maintaining their relationship,
and that a court can order visitation over the objection of the custodial parent. As Justice O'Connor pointed out in Troxel, "[It]he
State's recognition of an independent third-party interest in a child
can place a substantial burden on the traditional parent-child relationship." Any court order for grandparent visitation, therefore,
seriously interferes with the power of the custodial parent to make a
decision concerning the custody, care, and control of that child and
so has implicated the constitutional right to parent.
In Troxel, the Supreme Court strongly affirmed the constitutional right to parent and held that any court order for grandparent
visitation was subject to significant constitutional constraints. The
crux of the case, as Justice O'Connor put it, "involves nothing more
than a simple disagreement between the Washington Superior
Court and Granville [the custodial parent] concerning her children's
best interests." Granville wanted to limit the grandparents' visitation
to one day per month with no overnight stay, but the trial court's
order required visitation for one weekend per month, one week
during the summer, and on both of the grandparents' birthdays.
The Washington Supreme Court held that the Washington law
allowing the judge to award visitation to "any person" under the
amorphous "best interests of the child" standard unconstitutionally
infringed on the fundamental right of parents to rear their children.
In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of
the Washington Supreme Court. Justice O'Connor, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, wrote
the principal opinion. She found that the law, as applied in this
case to override the custodial parent's wishes about grandparent
visitation, "unconstitutionally infringes on the fundamental parental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children."
This was so for three reasons. First, the law contained no requirement that the judge accord any "special weight" to the parent's
own determination as to what was in the best interests of the child
and places the best interests determination solely in the hands of the
judge. Second, the trial judge failed to adhere to the presumption
that fit parents act in the best interests of their children, and in effect put the burden on the mother to show that visitation would
not be in the daughters' best interests. Third, the trial judge failed
to take into account the fact that the mother was willing to permit
some visitation. The Due Process Clause, said Justice O'Connor,
"does not permit a state to infringe on the fundamental right of
parents to make childrearing decisions simply because a state judge
believes a 'better' decision could be made."
Justice Souter found that the Washington law was unconstitutional on its face because it authorized any person at any time to
request and a judge to award visitation under the "best interests of
the child" standard. Justice Thomas concurred on the ground that
since neither party had argued that the right to parent was not a
fundamental right, the compelling governmental interest standard
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applied, and the State of Washington "lacks even a legitimate governmental interest-to say nothing of a compelling one-in secondguessing a fit parent's decision regarding visitation with third parties." Justices Stevens and Kennedy dissented and maintained that
the case should be remanded to the state court for a specific determination of whether the visitation order violated the mother's right
to parent. Justice Scalia dissented on the ground that the right to
parent should not be recognized as a fundamental right.
In my opinion, the precedential effect of Troxel is found in the
O'Connor opinion. All of the Justices except Scalia agreed that the
right to parent was a fundamental right and that grandparent/thirdparty visitation laws implicated that right. The six Justices voting to
affirm agreed that the visitation order in that case violated the constitutional rights of the mother, and neither the Stevens nor
Kennedy dissents said that the order was constitutional. Finally, the
four Justices in the O'Connor plurality and Justice Souter, agreed
that the state could not use a generalized "best interests of the
child" standard to determine third-party visitation. The Court did
not hold, however, that grandparent or third-parry visitation orders
were unconstitutional in all circumstances, and Justice O'Connor
stated that she agreed with Justice Kennedy that the constitutionality of any standard for awarding visitation "turns on the specific
manner in which that standard is applied."
Therefore, the holding of Troxel imposes three very significant
constitutional constraints on the application of grandparent visitation laws. First, the judge must proceed on the assumption that fit
parents will act in the best interests of their children, and the judge
must accord "special weight" to a parent's decision to limit or deny
grandparent visitation. Second, the judge cannot use the "best interests of the child" standard to override the decisions of the custodial parent with respect to grandparent visitation. Third, any visitation order must not interfere with the parent-child relationship or
with the parent's rightful authority over the child.
It is clear after Troxel that Michigan's grandparent visitation law
cannot constitutionally be applied as written. The law allows a
judge to order grandparent visitation without regard to the wishes

They will have to proceed on the assumption that fit parents have afundamental right
to make decisions concerning the custody, care, and control of their children and that fit parents
will act inthe best interests of their children.
of the custodial parent in any case in which the judge concludes
that grandparent visitation is "in the child's best interests." The
judge is not required to accord any weight, let alone "special
weight," to a parent's decision to limit or deny grandparent visitation. And there is no requirement that the visitation order not interfere with the parent-child relationship or with the parent's rightful
authority over the child. In short, Michigan's law contains all the
constitutional defects of the Washington law invalidated in Troxel.
Troxel requires that existing grandparent visitation orders be reconsidered in light of constitutional requirements.
However, following the precedent set by the Michigan Supreme
Court when it held, following Roe v Wade,7 that Michigan's antiabortion law could be applied within constitutional limits,8 the
Michigan courts can in effect interpret the grandparent visitation
law to incorporate the constitutional constraints of Troxel, and then
apply the law within constitutional limits. In my opinion, a grandparent visitation order may be constitutionally permissible in the
circumstances discussed by Justices Kennedy and Stevens in their
dissent in Troxel: when the custodial parent has denied any grandparent visitation at all and the denial of grandparent visitation reflects an "arbitrary exercise of parental authority that is not in fact
motivated by an interest in the welfare of the child."
Let me now suggest how a court can proceed in a constitutional
manner when presented with a petition for grandparent visitation
after Troxel. The court should deny the petition when the custodial
parent is willing to allow some grandparent visitation, since this enables the grandparent-child relationship to be preserved. But the
custodial parent must be free to decide the nature, extent, and
terms of the visitation. The judge cannot constitutionally substitute
his or her judgment for that of the custodial parent with respect to
what visitation is "reasonable." The Constitution requires that this
matter be left to the judgment of the custodial parent.
If the custodial parent has denied visitation entirely, the court
should then consider whether there has been a substantial existing
relationship between the grandparent and the child. If no such relationship has existed, it is the right of the custodial parent to decide
that it is not in the best interests of the child to establish a new relationship, even with a grandparent. A judge cannot constitutionally
override that decision because the judge thinks that children should
have a relationship with their grandparents.
If there has been a substantial existing relationship between the
grandparent and the child and the custodial parent cuts off that
relationship completely, we have a situation in which a visitation
order may be constitutionally permissible. Suppose that a couple
has been married for a number of years and the father's parents have
enjoyed a substantial grandparenting relationship with the children.
The father abandons the family and leaves the state. The mother
then informs the fathers' parents that they will "never see the children again." The fathers' parents petition for grandparent visitation.

At first glance this seems like an appropriate case for a grandparent visitation order. It would appear to an objective observer that
the mother is being spiteful and is depriving the children of a relationship with their grandparents in order to "get back" at her husband. But the judge must proceed cautiously, being mindful of the
constitutional constraints imposed by Troxel. The judge must presume that the mother is acting in the best interests of the children
and must give "special weight" to her determination that it is in the
best interests of her children to cut off contact with their grandparents after their son has deserted the family. The burden is on the
grandparents to show that mother is acting purely out of spite and
in a way that is clearly harmful to the children. If the judge, after reviewing all the evidence, concludes that in this case there has been
"an arbitrary exercise of parental authority that is not in fact motivated by an interest in the welfare of the child," it is constitutionally
permissible for the judge to order that the grandparents have some
visitation with their grandchildren.
The final constitutional requirement is that the court-ordered
visitation not interfere with the parent-child relationship or with the
parent's rightful authority over the child. The judge should direct
the custodial parent to present a plan for grandparent visitation
under which the parent will decide the nature, extent, and terms of
such visitation. The judge should accept the plan unless it is so
patently unreasonable as to be an effective denial of grandparent
visitation. The judge cannot constitutionally decide what amount
of grandparent visitation is "reasonable" or the circumstances in
which it shall take place.
As the above discussion makes clear, the circumstances in which
a court can constitutionally order grandparent visitation over the
objections of the custodial parent are very limited. The Constitution does indeed change everything and in our constitutional system, decisions about the relationship between children and their
grandparents belong to the custodial parent. *
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